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VANASKIE, Circuit Judge.   
 This matter arises under § 502(a)(3) of the Employee 
Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA), 29 U.S.C. 
§ 1132(a)(3), which authorizes suits by, inter alia, a pension 
plan beneficiary to enjoin any act or practice that violates 
ERISA, “to obtain other appropriate equitable relief . . . to 
redress such violations,” or to enforce any provision of 
ERISA or the terms of a pension plan.  Id.  Appellant Jeffrey 
Perelman is a participant in the defined employee pension 
benefit plan (the Plan) of Appellee General Refractories 
Company (GRC).  Jeffrey alleges that his father, Raymond 
Perelman, as trustee of the Plan, breached his fiduciary duties 
by covertly investing Plan assets in the corporate bonds of 
struggling companies owned and controlled by Jeffrey’s 
brother, Appellee Ronald Perelman.  Jeffrey contends that 
these transactions were not properly reported; depleted Plan 
assets; and increased the risk of default, such that his own 
defined benefits are in jeopardy.  The District Court 
dismissed several of Jeffrey’s claims for lack of constitutional 
standing, later granted summary judgment against him on all 
remaining claims, and denied his application for attorneys’ 
fees and costs under ERISA § 502(g)(1), 29 U.S.C. § 
1132(g)(1).  We will affirm. 
I.  
 In 1982, Raymond became the Chairman of GRC, a 
large manufacturer of industrial materials.1  Between 2003 
                                              
1 Our recitation of the factual background of this 
appeal is derived primarily from the Second Amended 
Complaint.   
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and 2009, Raymond was a trustee of the GRC Plan, and he 
served as Plan Administrator between 2003 and 2005.  In that 
position he exercised discretionary control over management 
of Plan assets and thus qualified as both a plan fiduciary and a 
“party in interest” under ERISA.  See 29 U.S.C. § 
1002(21)(A), (14)(A).  Jason Guzek, a defendant in this 
action but not an appellee, assumed the role of Plan 
Administrator from 2006 to 2008 and was succeeded by GRC 
itself as Plan Administrator in 2009. 
 Raymond’s son Ronald has been the controlling 
shareholder of Revlon, Inc., and its wholly owned subsidiary, 
Revlon Consumer Products Corporation (together, Revlon).  
Beginning in 2002, Raymond directed the Plan’s purchase of 
roughly $2 million of high-risk Revlon corporate bonds.  In 
2004, Raymond converted those bonds into Revlon stock.  He 
and his wife Ruth then assigned beneficial ownership of the 
Revlon shares to Mafco Holdings, Inc., another company 
owned and controlled by Ronald.  As Plan trustee, Raymond 
also invested Plan assets in a lending agreement between 
Revlon and MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc. 
(MacAndrews), an entity that, like Revlon, was principally 
owned by Ronald.  One consequence of these transactions 
was that Ronald, by virtue of his control over the voting 
rights of stock held by the Plan, became a Plan fiduciary 
under § 1002(21)(A).  Ronald also qualified as a “party in 
interest,” both because of that fiduciary status and as a 
relative of Raymond.  Id. § 1002(14)(A), (F). 
Since 1985, Jeffrey has been a participant in GRC’s 
defined benefit pension plan.  Jeffrey alleges that Raymond 
and Ronald, at the Plan’s expense, structured transactions to 
allow Ronald to raise capital for Revlon without sacrificing 
his control over the company.  Jeffrey contends that these 
6 
 
investments, which diminished Plan assets, were routinely 
misreported by the defendants on the annual reports that a 
plan administrator must file with the Internal Revenue 
Service (IRS) and Department of Labor.  See id. §§ 1023–24.  
Between 2003 and 2005, the reports did not disclose that the 
Plan held investments in Revlon bonds.  Instead, the 2003 and 
2004 reports stated that all Plan assets were invested in 
master trust accounts, while the reports from 2005 through 
2009 stated that all Plan assets were invested in mutual funds.  
Assessments from independent auditors, which were 
appended to the annual reports between 2003 and 2008, did 
disclose the investments in Revlon bonds, but either failed to 
identify those investments as party-in-interest transactions or 
did so for the wrong reasons.  The Plan’s investment in the 
lending agreement between Revlon and MacAndrews also 
was described inaccurately. 
 In October 2010, Jeffrey brought this lawsuit both as 
an individual and on behalf of the Plan against Raymond, 
Ronald, Guzek, and GRC.  The Second Amended Complaint, 
filed on July 21, 2011, asserts the following: breach of 
fiduciary duty of care under 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1)(B) 
against Raymond and Ronald (counts One and Ten, 
respectively); prohibited party-in-interest transactions under § 
1106 against Raymond and Ronald (counts Two and Nine); 
failure to diversify plan assets under § 1104(a)(1)(C) against 
Raymond, Guzek, and GRC (counts Three and Six); failure to 
update or maintain proper plan documents under §§ 1024–27 
against Raymond, Guzek, and GRC (counts Four and Seven); 
improper delegation of control of plan assets under § 
1104(a)(1) against Raymond (count Five); and failure to 
prosecute a co-fiduciary’s breach of fiduciary duty against 
Guzek, GRC, and Ronald (counts Eight and Eleven).  The 
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Complaint seeks monetary relief under ERISA § 502(a)(3), 
29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(3), in the form of restitution for Plan 
losses and disgorgement of profits.  It also demands 
injunctive relief, including removal of Raymond as trustee; 
appointment of an independent trustee; an outside audit for all 
Plan years from 2002 to 2010; an order enjoining Raymond 
from ever again serving in a fiduciary capacity for an ERISA 
plan; and an order declaring void any provision in the Plan or 
its Trust Agreement that would indemnify any defendant.  
Finally, the Complaint requests attorneys’ fees and costs 
under ERISA § 502(g)(1), 29 U.S.C. § 1132(g)(1). 
 In August 2012, the District Court found that Jeffrey 
lacked constitutional standing to pursue restitution and 
disgorgement claims because he had failed to demonstrate an 
actual injury to himself, as opposed to the Plan.  The Court 
nonetheless permitted Jeffrey to pursue the other requested 
forms of injunctive relief.  Thereafter, in September 2012, 
Raymond executed a corporate resolution terminating himself 
as trustee and appointing Reliance Trust Company to that 
position.2  GRC also retained the services of an independent 
investment manager for the Plan.  And earlier in 2012, 
Raymond voluntarily contributed $270,446.42 to the Plan’s 
trust.  None of these actions, however, included an admission 
of culpability or wrongdoing. 
                                              
2 The District Court later granted Jeffrey’s motion to 
add Reliance Trust Company as a defendant, but Jeffrey 
eventually stipulated to the dismissal of both Reliance and 
Guzek, neither of whom are parties to this appeal. 
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 In January 2013, the Court denied Jeffrey’s motion to 
file a Third Amended Complaint, finding that the addition of 
a claim for monetary damages under ERISA § 502(a)(2), 29 
U.S.C. § 1132(a)(2), would be futile, again for failure to 
allege an actual injury.  The Court also denied as moot 
Jeffrey’s bid to remove Raymond as trustee.  With respect to 
the trustee indemnification language, the Court concluded 
that the Plan’s clause fell within a safe-harbor provision 
because any indemnification would be funded by GRC rather 
than by the Plan itself.  Because the Trust Agreement, 
however, was ambiguous as to which entity would fund any 
indemnification, the Court concluded that Jeffrey had stated a 
claim for relief as to that document.  The Court dismissed 
Jeffrey’s claim to permanently bar Raymond from serving as 
an ERISA fiduciary, finding that the Secretary of Labor, 
rather than Jeffrey, was the appropriate party to seek such 
relief with respect to pension plans in which Jeffrey was not a 
participant or beneficiary.  And finally, the Court concluded 
that Jeffrey’s request for a historical audit would serve only to 
support an attendant claim for restitution and disgorgement, 
which the Court had already concluded was impermissible in 
the absence of actual injury sustained by Jeffrey.  The Court 
thus limited the scope of Jeffrey’s demand for an audit to a 
determination of whether the Plan was currently at risk of 
default. 
 In February 2014, the Court granted summary 
judgment in favor of the defendants on all remaining claims.  
First, the Court concluded that, under statutorily endorsed 
accounting principles, no genuine dispute of material fact 
existed as to whether the Plan was currently funded, meaning 
that Jeffrey was not entitled to audit relief.  The Court also 
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concluded that no live case or controversy existed with 
respect to the Trust Agreement’s indemnification clause. 
 On April 14, 2014, the District Court denied Jeffrey’s 
application for attorneys’ fees and costs, finding that Jeffrey 
had not achieved “some degree of success on the merits,” 
Ruckelshaus v. Sierra Club, 463 U.S. 680, 694 (1983), and 
that even if some degree of success had been achieved, 
Jeffrey had not demonstrated an entitlement to fees under the 
five-factor test announced in Ursic v. Bethlehem Mines, 719 
F.2d 670, 673 (3d Cir. 1983).  He filed a timely appeal. 
II.  
The District Court had jurisdiction under 29 U.S.C. § 
1132(e) and (f).  We have appellate jurisdiction under 28 
U.S.C. § 1291. 
 Jeffrey raises two main claims on appeal.  First, he 
contends that he has standing to seek monetary equitable 
relief such as disgorgement or restitution under ERISA § 
502(a)(3) because (1) he did in fact suffer an increased risk of 
Plan default with respect to his defined benefits, and (2) 
insofar as he seeks relief on behalf of the Plan, no showing of 
individual harm is necessary.  Second, Jeffrey challenges the 
denial of attorneys’ fees and costs, contending that (1) his 
lawsuit was a catalyst for the voluntary resolution of several 
issues, including Raymond’s resignation as Trustee, and (2) 
the District Court misapplied the five Ursic factors. 
A.  
 The burden of establishing standing lies with the 
plaintiff.  Berg v. Obama, 586 F.3d 234, 238 (3d Cir. 2009).  
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We exercise de novo review over a district court’s legal 
conclusions related to standing and review the factual 
elements underlying that determination for clear error.  
Edmonson v. Lincoln Nat’l Life Ins. Co., 725 F.3d 406, 414 
(3d Cir. 2013). 
 The three well-established elements of the doctrine of 
constitutional standing are as follows: 
First, the plaintiff must suffer an 
injury-in-fact that is concrete and 
particularized and actual or 
imminent, as opposed to 
conjectural or hypothetical.  
[Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 
504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992).]  
Second, “there must be a causal 
connection between the injury and 
the conduct complained of—the 
injury has to be ‘fairly . . . 
trace[able] to the challenged 
action of the defendant, and not . . 
. th[e] result [of] the independent 
action of some third party not 
before the court.’”  Id. (alterations 
in original) (quoting Simon v. E. 
Ky. Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 
26, 41–42 (1976)).  “Third, it 
must be likely, as opposed to 
merely speculative, that the injury 
will be redressed by a favorable 
decision.”  Id. (quotation marks 
omitted). 
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Id. at 415.   
Over the past fifteen years we have twice grappled 
with the complexities of constitutional standing as it relates to 
claims for monetary equitable relief brought by plan 
participants under ERISA § 502(a)(3).  See id. at 414–19; 
Horvath v. Keystone Health Plan E., Inc., 333 F.3d 450, 455–
57 (3d Cir. 2003).3  Jeffrey’s standing here, like that of the 
plaintiffs in Edmonson and Horvath, turns primarily on the 
first element—“injury-in-fact,” also described as “actual 
harm.”  See Horvath, 333 F.3d at 456.  With respect to claims 
for injunctive relief, such injury may exist simply by virtue of 
the defendant’s violation of an ERISA statutory duty, such as 
failure to comply with disclosure requirements.  See id.  
Claims demanding a monetary equitable remedy, by contrast, 
require the plaintiff to allege an individualized financial harm 
traceable to the defendant’s alleged ERISA violations.  Id. at 
457.4 
                                              
3 The parties do not dispute that Jeffrey, as a Plan 
participant and beneficiary, has statutory standing to bring a 
claim under ERISA § 502(a)(3). 
4 As we discuss below, our later opinion in Edmonson 
clarified that where a plaintiff seeks disgorgement, rather than 
“make-whole” relief such as restitution or surcharge, the 
financial harm need not necessarily take the form of a 
“loss”—it may instead consist of the measure of the 
defendant’s unjust profits coupled with the right of the 
beneficiary, as opposed to the plan, to those profits.  725 F.3d 
at 418. 
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 Jeffrey claims two financial injuries that, in his view, 
support a finding of standing to pursue “make-whole” 
equitable relief in the form of restitution or surcharge.  First, 
he submits expert testimony that the Plan suffered a net 
diminution in assets of approximately $1.3 million as a result 
of Raymond’s investment of Plan assets in Revlon debt.5  
Second, he offers expert testimony that due to this diminution 
in assets, the Plan’s risk of default increased dramatically.  He 
concedes, however, that to date, he has received all 
distributions under the Plan to which he was entitled. 
 In the case of a defined benefit plan, like the Plan here, 
the Supreme Court has established that diminution in plan 
assets, without more, is insufficient to establish actual injury 
to any particular participant.  See Hughes Aircraft Co. v. 
Jacobson, 525 U.S. 432, 439–41 (1999).  This stems from the 
fact that participants in such a plan are entitled only to a fixed 
periodic payment, and have no “claim to any particular asset 
that composes a part of the plan’s general asset pool.”  Id. at 
440.  Accordingly, even if the defendants’ dealings resulted in 
a diminution in Plan assets, they are insufficient to confer 
standing upon Jeffrey absent a showing of individualized 
harm. 
 By contrast, there is some support for the notion that a 
participant or beneficiary in a defined benefit plan has 
suffered an injury sufficient to pursue a claim for “make-
whole” equitable monetary relief under § 502(a) where the 
fiduciary’s alleged misconduct “creates or enhances the risk 
                                              
5 This sum accounts for Raymond’s voluntary payment 
of $270,446 into the Plan’s trust in 2012. 
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of default by the entire plan.”  LaRue v. DeWolff, Boberg & 
Assocs., Inc., 552 U.S. 248, 255 (2008).  The risk of default 
by defined benefit plans, of course, is not a novel or abstract 
concept.  Congress has sought rigorously to minimize or 
eliminate such risk by requiring defined benefit plans “to 
satisfy complex minimum funding requirements, and to make 
premium payments to the Pension Benefit Guaranty 
Corporation for plan termination insurance.”  Id. 
 Specifically, an employer must make “minimum 
required contribution[s]” to its defined benefit plan whenever 
“the value of plan assets” is less than the plan’s yearly 
“funding target,” defined as “the present value of all benefits 
accrued or earned under the plan as of the beginning of the 
plan year.”  26 U.S.C. § 430(a)(1), (d)(1); 29 U.S.C. § 
1083(a)(1), (d)(1).  In other words, an employer is required to 
contribute to a plan whenever the plan’s liabilities exceed its 
assets.  However, a plan does not qualify as “at-risk” or 
“underfunded”—statuses which trigger even more onerous 
funding safeguards—unless the value of plan assets is less 
than 80% of the plan’s funding target.  26 U.S.C. § 430(i)(4), 
(f)(3)(C); 29 U.S.C. § 1083(i)(4), (f)(3)(C). 
 Under the same statutory scheme, plan surpluses or 
shortfalls are calculated based on prevailing “segment rates,” 
i.e., interest rates based on historical bond yields.  See 26 
U.S.C. § 430(h)(2); 29 U.S.C. § 1083(h)(2).  On July 6, 2012, 
Congress enacted the Moving Ahead for Progress in the 21st 
Century Act (MAP-21), Pub. L. No. 112-141, § 40211, 126 
Stat. 405, 846–50 (2012), which authorized the use of new 
segment rates beginning December 31, 2011.  See 26 U.S.C. § 
430(h)(2)(C)(iv); 29 U.S.C. § 1083(h)(2)(C)(iv).  That 
authorization was extended in August 2014 and remains 
operative.  See Highway and Transportation Funding Act of 
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2014 (HAFTA), Pub. L. No. 113–159, § 2003, 128 Stat. 
1839, 1849–51 (2014).  As explained in HAFTA’s legislative 
history, “MAP–21 modified the interest rates used in valuing 
pension liabilities to give employers the option to effectively 
spread out the higher contributions over a longer period of 
time than would otherwise have been required.”  H.R. Rep. 
No. 113-520, pt. 1, at 19 (2014). 
 As of January 1, 2013, the date of the Plan’s most 
recent available actuarial report, the Plan had assets of 
approximately $13.6 million.  Jeffrey concedes that, under 
MAP-21 accounting methods, the Plan’s liabilities at that 
time were approximately $13.0 million, meaning that the 
Plan’s assets exceeded its liabilities.  By the same token, 
however, we accept his allegations (which are bolstered by 
his expert) that, under the statutory valuation methods 
predating MAP-21, the Plan’s liabilities on an ongoing plan 
basis were approximately $16 million—a ratio that left the 
Plan only 85% funded.  In Jeffrey’s view, the fact that the 
Plan’s assets were less than its liabilities under at least one 
analytical approach would permit a factual finding that 
Raymond’s dealings increased the risk that the Plan might 
default on its obligations.  Jeffrey argues that the dueling 
legitimacy of the two accounting approaches is a question of 
fact that must be resolved at trial. 
 We agree with the District Court, however, that the 
controlling yardstick here is provided by the finely tuned 
framework established by Congress.  Where a plan’s assets 
exceed its liabilities under a statutorily accepted accounting 
method, it passes muster as a matter of law, i.e., the employer 
need not make additional contributions to remove a 
designation of “at-risk” or “underfunded” status.  See, e.g., 
Harley v. Minn. Min. & Mfg. Co., 284 F.3d 901, 908 (8th Cir. 
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2002) (finding no injury where plan funding level had not 
triggered minimum required contributions); Adedipe v. U.S. 
Bank, Nat’l Ass’n, 62 F. Supp. 3d 879, 894–95 (D. Minn. 
2014) (concluding that the “relevant measure” for actual 
injury is whether the plan’s funding levels triggered minimum 
required contributions). 
 Here, the evidence is undisputed that as of January 1, 
2013, under a valuation method approved by Congress, the 
Plan was appropriately funded, and GRC had no obligation to 
make further contributions to stabilize the Plan’s finances.  
Under the circumstances, Jeffrey’s allegation that the Plan is 
nonetheless at risk of default is entirely speculative.  See 
David v. Alphin, 704 F.3d 327, 338 (4th Cir. 2013) (“[T]he 
risk that Appellants’ pension benefits will at some point in the 
future be adversely affected as a result of the present alleged 
ERISA violations is too speculative to give rise to Article III 
standing.”); Harley, 284 F.3d at 906–07 (noting that because 
of minimum contribution requirements, diminutions in plan 
surplus generally do not result in actual harm to 
beneficiaries).  Thus, like the District Court, we conclude that 
the SAC fails to allege the actual harm required to sustain 
constitutional standing for an individual claim of “make-
whole” equitable relief under § 502(a)(3). 
 Jeffrey also claims that he has standing to seek 
disgorgement of profits under Edmonson, where we 
recognized that “an ERISA beneficiary suffers an injury-in-
fact sufficient to bring a disgorgement claim when a 
defendant allegedly breaches its fiduciary duty, profits from 
the breach, and the beneficiary, as opposed to the plan, has an 
individual right to the profit.”  725 F.3d at 418.  He is correct 
that, to pursue such a claim, a plaintiff need not plead a 
financial loss.  Nonetheless, the plaintiff must still show “an 
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individual right to the defendant’s profit . . . .”  Id. at 417.  
Jeffrey has failed to do so. 
 Finally, Jeffrey argues that he need not prove an 
individualized injury insofar as he seeks monetary equitable 
remedies in a “derivative” or “representative” capacity on 
behalf of the Plan.6  Our own case law provides no support 
for this theory, and other federal appellate courts have 
unanimously rejected it.  See Alphin, 704 F.3d at 334–36 
(finding no representational standing where plaintiffs suffered 
no individualized injuries); McCullough v. AEGON USA Inc., 
585 F.3d 1082, 1086 (8th Cir. 2009) (same); Loren v. Blue 
Cross & Blue Shield of Mich., 505 F.3d 598, 608–09 (6th Cir. 
2007) (same); Glanton ex rel. ALCOA Prescription Drug 
Plan v. AdvancePCS Inc., 465 F.3d 1123, 1125 (9th Cir. 
2006) (noting that there is “no . . . tradition of unharmed 
ERISA beneficiaries bringing suit on behalf of their plans”); 
Harley, 284 F.3d at 906 (“[T]he limits on judicial power 
imposed by Article III counsel against permitting participants 
or beneficiaries who have suffered no injury in fact from 
                                              
6 There is no question that representative suits by plan 
participants or beneficiaries against fiduciaries for breach of 
fiduciary duty are permitted by, and generally brought under, 
ERISA § 502(a)(2).  See, e.g., Mass. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. 
Russell, 473 U.S. 134, 140 (1985).  A handful of courts have 
concluded that § 502(a)(3) also authorizes representative suits 
seeking equitable recovery on behalf of a plan.  See, e.g., 
Banyai v. Mazur, No. 00-civ-9806(SHS), 2007 WL 959066, 
at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 29, 2007).  We will not reach that 
question because we conclude that Jeffrey lacks standing in 
any event. 
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suing to enforce ERISA fiduciary duties on behalf of the 
Plan.”) (emphasis omitted).  Jeffrey provides no authority or 
other convincing reason for us to break from the reasoned 
consensus of our sister circuits.7  Accordingly, we conclude 
that Jeffrey lacks standing to sue under § 502(a)(3) even in a 
purely representative capacity insofar as he seeks monetary 
equitable relief.  In sum, we will affirm the District Court’s 
dismissal of all counts in the Second Amended Complaint 
insofar as Jeffrey seeks monetary equitable relief.8 
                                              
7 Jeffrey suggests that if plan participants and 
beneficiaries lack standing to bring representative claims for 
monetary equitable relief, misconduct by plan fiduciaries will 
go unpunished.  The Secretary of Labor, however, has 
standing to seek appropriate relief for fiduciary misconduct 
under § 502(a)(2). 
8 As noted earlier, Jeffrey also appeals from the 
District Court’s denial of his motion to file a Third Amended 
Complaint, which differed from his preceding drafts 
principally in that it sought monetary relief under ERISA § 
502(a)(2).  That provision allows plan beneficiaries to bring a 
derivative suit seeking relief from plan fiduciaries for breach 
of fiduciary duty under ERISA § 509, 29 U.S.C. § 1109.  See, 
e.g., In re Schering Plough Corp. ERISA Litig., 589 F.3d 585, 
594–95 (3d Cir. 2009).  We agree with the District Court that 
Jeffrey’s failure to allege actual injury leaves him without 
standing to bring suit for monetary damages under § 
502(a)(2), just as it bars his existing claims under § 502(a)(3).  
Accordingly, because Jeffrey’s proposed amendment would 
be futile, we will affirm the District Court’s denial of leave to 
amend. 
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B.  
 Jeffrey’s remaining challenge is to the District Court’s 
denial of attorneys’ fees and costs.  Our review of a district 
court’s denial of an award of attorneys’ fees is for abuse of 
discretion, but we review the applicable legal standards de 
novo.  McPherson v. Emps.’ Pension Plan of Am. Re-Ins. Co., 
33 F.3d 253, 256 (3d Cir. 1994). 
 ERISA § 502(g)(1) permits a district court to award “a 
reasonable attorney’s fee and costs” even to a losing party, 
although only one who has achieved “‘some degree of 
success on the merits.’”  Hardt v. Reliance Standard Life Ins. 
Co., 560 U.S. 242, 244–45 (2010) (quoting Ruckelshaus, 463 
U.S. at 694).  Surmounting that hurdle requires more than 
“‘trivial success on the merits’ or a ‘purely procedural 
victory.’”  Id. at 255 (quoting Ruckelshaus, 463 U.S. at 688 
n.9) (alteration omitted).  Instead, the court must be able to 
resolve the question “without conducting a ‘lengthy inquir[y] 
into the question whether a particular party’s success was 
                                                                                                     
Jeffrey also purports to appeal from all of the District 
Court’s many legal rulings contained within its orders of 
August 28, 2012, January 24, 2013, February 18, 2014, and 
April 14, 2014, including rulings addressing his claims for 
injunctive relief.  Nonetheless, he makes no tailored argument 
that the District Court’s dismissal or grant of summary 
judgment on those claims was inappropriate in any particular 
respect.  We will therefore affirm the District Court’s 
rejection of all remaining claims for equitable relief. 
19 
 
‘substantial’ or occurred on a ‘central issue.’”  Id. (alteration 
in original).   
 Here, Jeffrey relies on what we have called the 
“catalyst theory” to establish that he has achieved some 
degree of success on the merits.  Under that theory, a plaintiff 
may satisfy the Ruckelshaus standard if, despite failing to 
obtain a judgment or even a single ruling in his favor, his 
“litigation activity pressured a defendant to settle or render to 
a plaintiff the requested relief.”  Templin v. Independence 
Blue Cross, 785 F.3d 861, 866 (3d Cir. 2015) (emphasis 
omitted). 
 The District Court determined that Jeffrey had not 
achieved a level of substantive success sufficient to support 
an award of fees under ERISA § 502(g)(1).  We conclude 
otherwise.  The record reflects that, after the filing of 
Jeffrey’s lawsuit, Raymond stepped down as Plan trustee; an 
independent trustee was appointed; some Plan losses were 
reimbursed; Plan records were amended to reflect party-in-
interest transactions; and trustee-indemnification provisions 
were modified or removed.  Raymond’s counsel conceded 
that these actions, which for the most part numbered among 
the demands for relief stated in the Complaint, “were done in 
an effort to get rid of this case.”  App. 902.  The concessions 
were not merely procedural, and instead had a definite impact 
on Raymond’s degree of control over Plan assets and on the 
likelihood of accurate reporting of transactions involving Plan 
assets in the future.  Although such victories were non-
monetary, that renders them no less substantive. 
 Even where the party has achieved success on the 
merits, however, the district court nonetheless retains 
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discretion as to whether to award fees in light of the familiar 
Ursic factors, which include: 
(1) the offending parties’ 
culpability or bad faith; 
(2) the ability of the offending 
parties to satisfy an award of 
attorneys’ fees; 
(3) the deterrent effect of an 
award of attorneys’ fees against 
the offending parties; 
(4) the benefit conferred on 
members of the pension plan as a 
whole; and  
(5) the relative merits of the 
parties’ position[s]. 
719 F.2d at 673.  The District Court considered the Ursic 
factors in the alternative, and found that although the second 
and third factors—ability to pay and deterrent effect—
weighed in Jeffrey’s favor, the first, fourth, and fifth 
factors—culpability, benefit conferred on Plan members other 
than Jeffrey, and the relative merits of the parties’ positions—
weighed against an award of fees.  On the whole, the Court 
found that an award of fees was not appropriate. 
 We conclude that the District Court did not abuse its 
discretion by declining to award fees.  First, the culpability of 
the defendants remains speculative.  Second, the benefit of 
Jeffrey’s lawsuit to other Plan participants has been of a 
limited and non-monetary nature—the Plan itself remains 
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fully funded under federal benchmarks.  And third, for the 
reasons already stated at great length both here and in the 
District Court, Jeffrey’s legal efforts to date, which have 
involved several years of litigation and four iterations of the 
complaint, were predicated in large part upon a flawed theory 
of constitutional standing.  Under the circumstances, we 
conclude that the District Court did not abuse its discretion in 
declining to compel the defendants to finance Jeffrey’s 
lawsuit.  Accordingly, we will affirm the District Court’s 
denial of attorneys’ fees and costs to Jeffrey under ERISA § 
502(g)(1). 
III.  
 For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the District 
Court’s orders of August 28, 2012; January 24, 2013; 
February 18, 2014; and April 14, 2014. 
